Jack: “Kant talks about the inevitability of teleological presuppositions in the cognition of nature. Humans discover causal, mechanistic laws in nature, but in universalizing these discoveries, they must adopt teleological presuppositions. However, in today’s science, especially in biology, I understand that randomness is emphasized more. If teleological presuppositions become meaningless, what happens to issues of history and ethics?”

Jones: “In my opinion, presupposing ‘purpose’ within the modern scientific methodology seems unscientific. Especially since Darwin’s theory of evolution, the issue has been more firmly criticized. From a Darwinian perspective, the evolution of life forms is not directed towards any purpose but occurs through random mutations and natural selection in certain environments, favoring those who survive and reproduce better. Therefore, teleological discussions, like those in Aristotelian biology, are thoroughly excluded, and it seems that this problem is being addressed by replacing the term ‘purpose’ with ‘function’. Thus, a functional discourse eliminates teleological discussions, which is a completely different perspective from thinking that an inherent purpose or essence exists in a life form as a result of accidental events. This worldview would naturally lead to a completely different understanding of history and ethics.”

Jack: “Then, can’t the concept of survival be seen as a kind of teleological presupposition? It is necessary for the process of evolution.”

Jones: “There are evolutionists who unfold their discourse as if ‘survival’ has an inherent purpose, but viewing ‘survival’ or ‘reproduction’ as an inherent purpose within life forms is different from seeing them as outcomes of random events that result in better survival and reproduction. The former is metaphysical, while the latter can be considered within the realm of scientific thought.”

Jack: “Ah… so it’s just derived through that process.”

Jones: “Excluding metaphysical teleology means that there is no inherent ‘essence.’ That’s not scientific. Of course, if it were ‘more scientific,’ we couldn’t even say whether such purposes or essences exist or not. Modern normal science operates on empirical and positivistic foundations. The problem is that many experiments in contemporary science often go unverified. Therefore, there are increasingly more people today advocating for the re-verification of other scientists’ experiments.”

Jack: “Kant criticizes metaphysical teleology, but he seems to adopt it due to epistemological necessity.”

Jones: “In the second part of Kant’s ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment,’ he criticizes various systems of natural purposiveness, saying none dare claim they have achieved what they advocate, due to the inexplicability of natural purposes. And he states that the concept of objective purposiveness in nature is a critical principle of reason for reflective judgment. We should consider why Kant insists on the purposiveness of nature on an epistemological level. Perhaps it’s because of a demand related to human ethics?”

Jack: “Not prescriptive, but reflective?”

Jones: “Yes, if we don’t at least reflectively request purposiveness, we can’t address the issues of human ethics amidst randomness. In Darwinism, all meanings and values of life phenomena are determined by survival and reproduction outcomes.”

Jack: “In ‘Critique of Practical Reason,’ Kant discusses the major principle and the subordination of rules, and how this major principle should be presupposed is the crux of the critique of judgment. The major principle is a matter of common sense applicable to everyone and should be treated as self-evident, based on the aesthetic judgment provided by nature itself.”

Jones: “That nature gives such aesthetic judgment to the human perceiver itself presupposes some purpose within nature.”

Jack: “But if these aesthetic judgments are to operate within the limits of epistemology, the purposefulness must be presupposed at the base of cognition to grasp the various activities of nature. Of course, this reference is derived from Newton’s view of science, based on strict causality and the mechanical nature of nature.”

Jones: “But today, Newton’s view or worldview has become outdated, and that’s where Kant is criticized.”

Jack: “Modern science has surpassed Newton, so I wonder how we can talk about history and ethics in this world where nothing is taken for granted.”

Jones: “Newton presupposed absolute time and space, which have been relativized in modern science. Also, in biology, from a Darwinian perspective, it’s nonsensical to think that norms or imperatives are inherent in nature, and in quantum physics, all physical phenomena are explained by ‘probability,’ not causality anymore. Our worldview has become such today. The knowledge based on such scientific understanding creates cultures and civilizations, so we need to reconsider what it means to be human in this world.”

Jack: “Then ethics might just become a way of getting by?”

Jones: “But humans are not merely beings dependent on the world and nature, so I think the issue of ethics could become even deeper. It seems we’ve reached a point where we must examine the essence of humanity on a more fundamental level.”

Jack: “Hmm… that might be the case.”

Jones: “The interpretations and implications of viewing the world, nature, and life phenomena in such a way pose a critical challenge for us to evaluate and reflect upon, and we must seek better paths.”

Jack: “But explaining freedom seems to be getting more difficult.”

Jones: “You’re right. Modern individuals feel that physical explanations better describe our world, so the issue of human freedom is also likely to be seen as something that can be reduced to physical aspects.”

Jack: “Freedom should be seen in relation to necessity, but it seems difficult to assume necessity.”

Jones: “But we must distinguish between reducing something in a reductionist way, theoretically, or metaphysically. There might still be room to discuss the issue of human freedom. Just because freedom explains the past better and thus predicts the future more accurately, does it disappear? Rather, might the issue of freedom become even clearer? The darker it gets, the brighter the stars shine. Our task is to ensure that ordinary people do not abandon their humanity through theoretical discourse.”

Jack: “I’m quite interested in communitarianism, and I think presupposing purposefulness is inevitable for what the community aims for. However, we need to revisit this process. If presupposing purposefulness becomes impossible, wouldn’t it be impossible to strive towards power in life?”

Jones: “If we were to explain human social phenomena purely biologically, then yes, it would all be about living. Gathering because we want to live. Survival and reproduction! Isn’t that why humans gather? Of course, the layers and depth of what ‘living’ means vary greatly from person to person.”

Jack: “It’s gotten quite late. It would be great to continue this conversation another time.”

Jones: “Yes, let’s do that.”